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THE NARCOTICS BUREAU AND THE HARRISON ACT:
JAILING THE HEALERS AND THE SICK
RUFUS 6. KINGt
[This issue of the JOURNAL contains two studies of
the narcotics problem. A Comment, beginning on
page 751, presents a general survey of narcotics
regulation. Mr. King's Article focuses on the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the Harrison Act, and
the resulting impact upon addicts and physicians.]
AT last there are faint stirrings to suggest that this nation's policies towards
its narcotic drug traffic may soon be exposed to a full critical re-examination
and review.' Nearly forty years have gone by since Congress passed the
Harrison Act,2 intended partly to carry out a treaty obligation,8 but mainly
to aid the states in combatting a local police problem which had gotten some-
what out of hand.4 In other areas of law enforcement, when Congress has
thrown federal power into the balance, these local problems have usually
diminished or disappeared.5 In the case of narcotics control, however, the in-
dications are all quite to the contrary.
It must be conceded that there are large gaps in what we know about nar-
cotics addiction and the illicit traffic. The Comment elsewhere in the JOURNALO
presents a dispassionate collection of information and authorities. Yet there
is simply not much to go by. When the federal authorities took over, we
entered a forty-year eclipse; for years on end there has been nothing but the
"official line" for those who wished to inquire into the subject. But enough
information is available to convince this writer, along with a handful of other
' Special Counsel, Subcommittee of House Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate
the Department of Justice; Special Counsel, Investigations Subcommittee of Senate Inter-
state Commerce Committee.
1. See note 70 infra. See also SEN. RE'. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; Hearings
before Special Committee to Investigate Organizced Crbne in Interstate Conmerce, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 14 (1951); GoLDsTEIN, NARcoTIcs, A REPORT BY THE AaroRNnv GE N-
ERAL TO THE IXGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NFW YORK (Legis. Doe. No. 27, 1952).
2. 38 STAT. 785 (1914), 26 U.S.C. § 2550 (1946).
3. The United States adhered to the Hague Opium Convention on January 23, 1912
(38 ;STAT. 1912 (1912)) ; this obliged adherents to control the manufacture, sale, use, and
transfer of "morphine, cocaine and their respective salts."
4. See, H.R. REP. No. 23, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1913).
5. See, e.g., 31 STAT. 188 (1900), 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1946) (poaching); 41 STAT. 32,t
(1919), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13 (1946) (transportation of stolen vehicles) ; 47 STAT, 326
(1932), 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1946) (kidnapping).
6. Comment, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L.J. 751 (1953).
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protestants, 7 that the United States-alone among civilized nations-has
driven relentlessly down the wrong road ever since the end of World War I.
This article (which is not dispassionate) will relate the episode in our legal
history which propelled our enforcement agencies along this road. But first
it may be helpful to set forth a brief history of the relationship between the
addict and his Government.
Our grievous error was in allowing the narcotics addict to he pushedl out
of society and relegated to the criminal community. He isn't a criminal. He
never has been. And nobody looked on him as such until the furious blitz-
krieg launched around 1918 in connection with the enforcement of the Har-
rison Act.
That Act was a tax measure, designed and intended to bring the domestic
traffic in narcotics into the open under a licensing system, so that the sloppy
dispensing practices of the day could be checked. It said nothing about "ad-
dicts" (partly because the word had not achieved its wide current usage).
and specifically exempted the "patient" in bona fide doctor-patient relation-
ships.8 Narcotics-users were "sufferers" or "patients" in those days; they
could and did get relief from any reputable medical practitioner, and there
is not the slightest suggestion that Congress intended to change this-beyond
cutting off the disreputable "pushers" who were thriving outside the medical
profession and along its peripheries.
Two things, very likely related, distorted this intent. The Act was assigned,
for enforcement, to the same righteous zealots who were undertaking another
national mistake--enforcement of our then new Prohibition laws:0 and,
secondly, a great public hullabaloo about the "dope menace" swept the
country.' 0 The narcotics-user suddenly became a "dope fiend." Official esti-
7. See, e.g., Remarks of Hon. John M. Coffee. 83 Co.G. REt7. 2 07 (1933 j- Steven.,
Make Dope Legal, Harpers Magazine, Nvcmber, 1952, p. 40; Statement (f R,. Ckw.-
land M. Bailey, member of House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, March
23, 1953.
8. The exempting language, relieving from the duty to use Treasury-prescri!k2d order
forms, 38 STAT. 786 (1914), 26 U.S.C. § 2554(c) (1) (1946), is:
"Nothing contained in the section . . .shall apply . . . [tlo the dispensing
or distribution of any of the drugs mentioned ... to a Patient by a physician,
dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under section 3221 in the course of
his professional practice only. .. ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Those who avail themselves of this exemption must keep records of each transaction
for a prescribed period.
9. Schmeckebier, The Bureau of Prohibition in SEavxiL Mo.:oGRra 57, I;sT. xon
Gov'T REsEARcH, BRooKmxGs INsT. 3 (1929). The Narcotics Division was mergc, int,-
the Prohibition Unit of the Treasury Department in 1920, and carried into the Prohibi-
tion Bureau when the latter was created in 1927. Since 1930 it has been a separate
entity entitled the Federal Narcotics Bureau.
10. See, New York Times, April 10, 1919, p. 1; U.S. Trn s. D)-v'T, Rsrxi~y ori-
SPECiAL CoMu=rr To INxvEsT.IT THE TRAFFic nz Nncui rc DRuGs (April 15, 1919)
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mates of the addict-population leapt to the fantastic figure of one million-
mostly young folk, many "under the age of 20."'1 The good people of our
land were terrified. The Narcotics Division of the Treasury Department came
charging to the rescue: our prisons began to fill, not with illicit peddlers only,
but with addicts-and reputable medical men who had tried to help them. 12
And there has been no surcease from that day to this.
In sum, the Narcotics Division succeeded in creating a very large criminal
class for itself to police (i.e., the whole doctor-patient-addict-peddler com-
munity), instead of the very small one that Congress had intended (the smug-
gler and the peddler). Subsequent Division officials have sustained the en-
forcement-oriented propaganda barrage: the addict is a criminal, a criminal
type, or laden with criminal tendencies ;13 addicts can only be dealt with by
being tracked down and isolated from society in total confinement ;14 the cure-
all is more arrests and stiffer criminal penalties for all narcotics offenders ;16
(quoted in U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, THE TRAFIC IN HAIT-FoMING NARcoTIc DiUGs
(1923)).
11. U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, THE TRAFFIC IN HABIT-FoPnING NARCOTIC DRUGS (1923).
It is noteworthy that as soon as the Narcotics Division turned to reporting its enforce-
ment achievements, this estimate dropped to 100,000 and remained at that figure until
World War II.
12. As of June 30, 1928, of the 7738 prisoners in federal penitentiaries, 2529 were
sentenced for narcotics offenses, 1156 for prohibition law violations, and 1148 for stolen-
vehicles transactions. Data are not available for approximately the same number in state
institutions at this time. Schmeckebier, supra note 9, at 143.
13. -See, e.g., FEDERAL NARcoTIcs BUREAU, MFMORANDUM REGARDING NARCOTIC
CLINics, THEIR HISTORY AND HAZARDS 6 (1938):
"With regard to the plan which is in effect in Formosa, we have a valuable
and informing contribution to our knowledge on the subject by Dr. Somei
To of the Health Commission of Formosa. After classifying 57,073 crimes
committed during seven years by natives of Formosa, his records show that
based upon the relative proportion of opium users to non-users we find
70.83% criminality among ophim users as against 29.17% crinnality among
non-users. In Formosa, opium smoking is licensed and the cost of opium is
very small. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THE ONLY ATTRIBUT-
ABLE CAUSE FOR GREATER CRIMINALITY AMONG NAR-
COTIC ADDICTS THAN NON-ADDICTS IS THE DIRECT EF-
FECT OF THE USE OF NARCOTICS UPON THE CHARACTER
OF THE USER. Dr. To gives us the answer. It is because drug addiction
causes a relentless destruction of character and releases criminal tendencies,"
(Emphasis as in original).
14. Id. at 4:
"Medical authorities agree that the treatment of addiction with the view
toward effecting a cure, which makes no provision for confinement while
the drug is being withdrawn, is a failure, except in a relatively small number
of cases where the addict is possessed of a much greater degree of will power
than the average addict."
15. See testimony of Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, in
Hearings before Special Committee to Investigatc Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 14, pp. 426-32 (1951).
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and anyone who raises a dissenting voice is most likely a bungling "do-
gooder"'0 or one who wants to undermine the foundations of our society.17 The
states have been pushed and swept along this same vindictive line of ap-
proach,ls with very few dissents.' 9 And the present campaign is as vigorous
and formidable as ever.2 1 To this campaign, the judiciary made its own con-
tribution in a series of decisions rendered in the 1920's and to which we now
turn.
THE NARCOTIZATION OF THE HIGH COURT
Dr. Behrman and His Predecessors
Before the Narcotics Division could really turn the nation into a happy
hunting ground, stocked with addicts as fair game, it had to drive the medical
profession out of the way. As has been noted, Section 2 of the Harrison Act
exempted the prescription of drugs "to a patient by a physician . . . in the
course of his professional practice only."' This was unrevealing draftsman-
ship,22 and many doctors felt that the agonies of unrelieved addiction were as
much encompassed in their Hippocratic Oath as any other human suffering.
16. See, e.g., McCarthy, .4 Prosecutor's 1iewapoint on Narcotic A-ddiciion in Fed.
Prohib. Q., October, 1943 (reprinted and distributed by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
in 1945).
17. In the Chicago Daily News, December 15, 1952, the last argument in extremis
was set forth by local public officials of that city: prop ,nents of clinic trCatmeit for
narcotic addicts are obviously communists or communist-inspired, sceling to destroy
the integrity of the American people.
18. ILLINOIs LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DIsPosiTikN oF N mcOTIC LAw OFFz.rEznS .AlU
ADDICTS 12-19 (1951). A careful distinction must be made bitween incarceration per se,
and programs which place true emphasis on treatment and rehabilitation. The iedcral
hospitals at Lexington, Ky., and Fort Worth, Texas, are admirable examleb, ul the
latter.
19. Governors Green and Stevenson both vetoed incarceration laws for the state of
Illinois because no provisions for adequate treatment had been made. Vetw nes.ages,
July 24, 1947, and August 9, 1949, respectively. In the words of Governor Stevenson:
"It appears that the provision in this Bill authorizing imprisonment may
have been intended only as a threat to compel the addict to undergo treat-
ment, but whatever may have been the intention in this regard, the Bill does
authorize imprisonment for a condition which it is admitted does not con-
stitute a criminal act."
20. The Narcotics Bureau is pressing a bill, H.R. 3307, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953),
which would provide incarceration for all addicts in the District of Columbia. The worbt
feature of this bill-in the light of the full problem-is a "snealker" in the recitation of
its purpose, which reads:
"The Congress intends that Federal criminal laws shall be enforced against
drug users as well as other persons. .. "
This may prove as effective, and as tricky, as the "rigged" indictment to which this
article is principally addressed.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. The legislative history of the provision sheds little light. The original draft
required that the physician "shall personally attend upon such patient." H.R. REP. No. 23,
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The Division's assault on this expression of the physician's conscience
started in the courts. The Government aimed for a construction which would
exclude from the Harrison Act exemption a doctor's dispensation of nar-
cotics to ease an addict's craving. The attack had two objectives: to end all
so-called ambulatory treatment 23 (including the clinic system for controlled
distribution of drugs to addicts 24), and then, if possible, to drive the profes-
sion away from the addict altogether. It succeeded in both goals-for a brief
period. But its short-lived success was enough, as we shall see. Government
victories in the Supreme Court, culminating in United States v. Behrman,3
pose two problems that are broader than the subject matter of this discussion.
To what extent is it morally justified for an administrative agency to select
the cases it feeds our appeals courts in order to gain some desired interpreta-
tion or result? And how far ought the rule of stare decisis be extended into
successive administrative actions and interpretations-particularly when the
court decision underlying the original action has meanwhile been effectively
overruled ?
The Harrison Act came through its first constitutional test by a five-to-four
margin.26 On the same day the Court decided Webb v. United States,"7 a
physician case under the exemption in Section 2. The facts showed flagrant
abuse; the doctor had sold prescriptions-4,000 of them in eleven months-
indiscriminately to' anyone for 50 cents apiece. The issue was presented in a
certified question:
"If a practicing and registered physician issues an order for morphine
to an habitual user thereof, the order not being issued by him in the
course of professional treatment in the attempted cure of the habit,
but being issued for the purpose of providing the user with morphine
sufficient to keep him comfortable by maintaining his customary use,
63d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1913). The Senate proposed changing this to: "shall have been
specially employed to prescribe for the particular patient receiving such drug: And pro-
vided further, That such drug shall be dispensed in good faith and not for the purpose of
avoiding the provisions of this act." SEN. RW. No. 258, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1914).
The ensuing conference adopted the present language without edifying comment, merely
noting that the requirement of personal attendance had been dropped and that the dis-
pensing physician, etc., would be required to keep records. H.R. RFa,. No. 1196, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914).
23. There is a much-neglected distinction between prescription of narcotics to an
addict for self-administration, and direct administration by the physician. The former
is the subject of valid criticism, i.e., it does remove all restraints on consumption by the
addict, and the drugs prescribed may be resold in the illicit traffic. There is merit in the
suggestion, made from time to time, that all self-administration of narcotics should be
made illegal. The "official line" has always ignored this distinction, equating prescription
for self-administration with direct or supervised administration, and attacking both as
"ambulatory treatment."
24. See notes 70, 72 infra; Comment, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L.J. 751 (1952).
25. 258 U.S. 280 (1922). See pages 741-4 infra.
26. United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
27. 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
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is such order a physician's prescription under exception (b) of
§ 2 ?,,28
The Court replied:
"[T]o call such order for the use of morphine a physician's prescrip-
tion would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion of
the subject is required." -9
Note how the question was loaded: "sufficient to keep him comfortable by
maintaining his customary use" is not a description of the facts of the case;
it not only blankets the outright peddling involved in the case before the Court,
but it also reaches toward the bona fide administration of drugs for the relief
of a patient-addict.
The next case, Jin Fifey Moy v. Uhiitcd States,3 0 was likewise flagrant on
its facts. The doctor had prescribed morphine to strangers indiscriminately,
in bulk, 8 to 10 grams at a time, for $1.00 per gram. The Court, this time
apparently choosing its own wording, said:
"Manifestly the phrases 'to a patient' and 'in the course of his profes-
sional practice only' are intended to confine the immunity of a regis-
tered physician, in dispensing the narcotic drugs mentioned in the
act, strictly within the appropriate bounds of a physician's profes-
sional practice, and not to extend it to include a sale to a dealer or a
distribution intended to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving
of one addicted to the use of the drug."3 1
Again, the language goes beyond the facts of the case. It separates "pro-
fessional practice" from any administration whatsoever "intended to cater to
the appetite or satisfy the craving" of an addict.
Now the stage was set for Dr. Behrman. For purposes of finding the
doctor a peddler for profit, the case presented an ideal set of facts. He was
arrested in New York for giving one addict, at one time, for use as the addict
saw fit, prescriptions for 150 grains of heroin, 360 grains of morphine, and
210 grains of cocaine. 32 Again the question posed was whether this was "in
the course of his professional practice only." The Government, however, drew
up a trick indictment, alleging not that the prescriptions were incompatible
with approved and proper therapeutic treatment, but instead alleging that, in
effect, the drugs were given in a good faith attempt to cure the addict.=
23. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99 (1919).
29. Id. at 99-100.
30. 254 U.S. 189 (1920).
31. Id. at 194.
32. Enough, as the Supreme Court noted, for over 3,000 standard injcetiwns. United
States v. Belrman, 258 U.S. 2S0, 289 (1922).
33. After reciting the delivery to the addict, one Willie King, the indictment alkged
"'that on said date the said Willie King was a person addicted to the
habitual use of morphine, heroin and cocaine and known by the dvfendant
to be so addicted; that on said date the said Willie King did nut require
the administration of either morphine, heroin, ur cocaine by reason of any
1953]
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Behrman demurred. The district judge delivered a brief tirade against
"ambulatory treatment," but reluctantly sustained the demurrer, referring to
a decision in another trick-indictment case,3 4 and closing with an inviting con-
clusion: "For the sake of uniformity in this district, however, I am disposed
to follow precedent until the question is concluded by a decision of the Su-
preme Court."3 5
The Government appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court 80 and
promptly moved to advance it, stating in support of its motion:
"[The case involves] a matter of general public interest, viz.,.
what is the meaning of the words 'in the course of his professional
disease or condition other than such addiction, and the defendant did not
dispense said drugs or any of them to said Willie King for the purpose of
treating any disease or condition other than such addiction; that none of
the said drugs so dispensed by the defendant was administered or intended
by the defendant to be administered to the said Willie King by the defendant
or by any nurse or person, other than the said Willie King, acting under
the direction of the defendant, nor were any of said drugs consumed or
intended by the defendant to be consumed by the said Willie King in the
presence of the defendant, but all of said drugs were put in the physical
possession and control of the said Willie King with the intention on the
part of the defendant that the said Willie King would use same by
self-administration in divided doses over a period of several days, the amount
of each of each of said drugs dispensed as aforesaid being more than suf-
ficient or necessary to satisfy the craving of the said Willie King therefor if
consumed by him all at one time; that said Willie King was not, at the time
and place aforesaid, nor was he intended to be, during the period in which
the drugs dispensed as aforesaid were to be used by him, under the observa-
tion and physical control of the defendant or of any nurse or other person
acting under the direction of the defendant, nor was said Willie King
in any way restrained or prevented from disposing of said drugs in any
manner he might see fit; that said drugs dispensed by the defendant to the
said Willie King as aforesaid were not mixed with any other substance,
medicinal or otherwise, but were in the form in which said drugs are
usually consumed by persons addicted to the habitual use thereof to satisfy
their craving therefor and were adapted for such consumption; against the
peace ... etc." Transcript of Record, pp. 2-3, United States v. Behrman, 258
U.S. 280 (1922).
For a rather complete paraphrase of the indictment, see United States v. Behrman,
258 U.S. 280, 286-7 (1922).
34. United States v. Balint, C. 28/136, S.D.N.Y., June 28, 1921, in Transcript of
Record, pp. 4-5, United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), in which the indictment
alleged violation of § 2 of the Harrison Act without including the word "willfully." De-
fendant's demurrer to the indictment was sustained, and the indictment dismissed, bid.
The dismissal was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court, United States v. Balint,
supra, which ruled that it was not necessary that defendant have knowledge of the fact
that the product sold was a drug whose sale was regulated by the Act.
35. United States v. Behrman, C. 28/425, S.D.N.Y., Sept. 21, 1921, in Transcript of
Record, pp. 5-6, United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
36. Under the Criminal Appeals Act, 34 STAT. 1246 (1907), now as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. 1951).
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practice only' in that portion of the Act which exempts from its pro-
visions the dispensing or distribution of the drugs to a patient by a
physician 'in the course of his professional practice only.'
"The practical administration of the Harrison Narcotic Act is de-
pendent, to a very large extent, upon the decision which this court
may render in [this case] ." 37
In the Behrman brief, Solicitor General Beck made no attempt to gloss over
what was being sought, apparently relying-rightly, as the outcome proved-
on the flagrancy of the case and the prevailing temper of the times.-I
"The purpose of this indictment and of the present writ of error is
to raise for the determination of this court the following questions,
iz, whether the so-called 'ambulatory treatment' of drug addicts by
a physician is or is not, as a watter of law, prohibited by section 2 of
the Harrison Narcotic Act .... By the term 'ambulatory treatment'
is meant the treatment by a physician of a drug addict, for the alleged
cure of his drug addiction, by giving to him a prescription for the
amount of the drug which the physician, in good faith, believes to be
necessary in the condition of the drug addict at the time the prescrip-
tion is given, for his use as one dose or over a period of time, and
allowing the addict to take the prescription and to use it in any man-
ner he may see fit, without any supervision or control of the doctor
over him in any manner or form whatsoever.29
C'
"The theory of the indictment is that this action upon the part of the
defendant was, not a question for the jury, either on the defendant's
intent, or as to what constituted the legitimate practice of his pro-
fession, but a violation of the Harrison Narcotic Act as a matter of
law. ....
"In order that the matter may be made perfectly dear, it should be
again insisted that, according to the indictment, the so-called 'patient'
in this case was suffering from no disease whatever except drug ad-
diction. It must be admitted, for the purpose of the case at bar, that
drug addiction is a disease, and that the defendant intended by his
method of treatment to cure the same, and honestly believed that he
could cure the disease by this method. Nevertheless, it is a well
known fact, of which this court has taken notice, that drug addicts as
a class are persons weakened materially in their sense of moral re-
sponsibility and in their power of will, and this court also knows, as
a matter of common kmowledge, that, in any community where drugs
are prescribed, there will be a large number of physicians to whom
any construction of section 2 of the Harrison Narcotic Act will be
applicable. The question therefore, is whether every physician
licensed and registered under the Harrison Narcotic Act, is at liberty,
if he honestly believes such a course to be proper, to furnish to per-
37. Motion to Advance, p. 2, United States v. Balint, 253 U.S. 25U (1W22), United
States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
38. Brief for United States, pp. 7-8, 12-13, 18, United States v. Bedrnan, 25S U.S.
280 (1922).
39. This description was far from precise. See note 23 supra.
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sons of the character of drug addicts the means to obtain drugs with-
out any supervision upon the part of the various doctors involved of
the manner or time of taking the drugs or whether, indeed, the drugs
are ever taken by the addict at all.
"It is true that in the Doremus, Webb, and Jin Fiey Moy cases it
was assumed that the physician .. .did not honestly intend to effect
a cure of the drug addiction and did not honestly believe that his
method would effect a cure, but was merely administering the drug
to satisfy the cravings of the addict; and that this court is asked in
the case at bar to go beyond these decisions, and to hold that, irre-
spective of the physician's intent or belief, the act is violated where
the drugs are placed by him in the sole control and subject to the
unrestricted disposal of the drug addict."
Justice Day and five of his associates sustained the Government's position,
reversing the district court and thus putting the stamp of approval on the
Behrmnan indictment. That the majority of the Court did not see clearly what
they were doing-notwithstanding the Government's candid brief-is appar-
ent from the fact that they relied heavily on the mere amount of the prescrip-
tions, 40 apparently without realizing that the doctrine they were setting would
make volume-and good faith, as well-irrelevant. The other three Justices,
Holmes, Brandeis, and McReyrnolds, were more clairvoyant. Justice Holmes
wrote for them:
"It seems to me wrong to construe the statute as creating a crime
in this way without a word of warning. Of course the facts alleged
suggest an indictment in a different form, but the Government pre-
ferred to trust to a strained interpretation of the law rather than to
a finding of a jury upon the facts. I think that the judgment should
be affirmed." '41
After Behrman
If some members of the Court were not fully aware of what they were
giving in the Behrman holding, the Narcotics Division nonetheless saw per-
fectly clearly -what it had received. Manifestly, if a Behrnman indictment was
unassailable when it charged the dispensing of shocking amounts of drugs,
it was no less unassailable when it charged a minute quantity only. The Di-
vision had what it wanted. Any doctor who prescribed any narcotic drug to
any addict could be threatened with prosecution or packed off to prison-
and good faith was no defense. Immediately there commenced a reign of
terror.
The medical profession was shamelessly bullied and threatened, until it
withdrew, totally and irrevocably, as the addict's last point of contact with
society.42 The narcotics clinics, which had been established in a number of
40. United States v. Bebrinan, 258 U.S. 280, 288-9 (1922).
41. Id. at 290 (dissent).
42. It is noteworthy, for its bearing on the addicts-are-criminals argument, iter alia,
that addiction ainong doctors themselves has always been a problem, alluded to by thv
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states to alleviate the situation, were closed-in some instances as a direct re-
sult of threats by Division agents.43 In 1924 a special committee of the Ameri-
can Medical Association docilely reported its "firm conviction" that ambula-
tory treatment of narcotics addicts "begets deception, extends the abilse of
habit-forming narcotic drugs, and causes an increase in crime."4 4 An earlier
version of this report (prior to its adoption by the A..A.) had been reprinted
by the Division (a practice, as to "approved" materials, that continues to this
day) and had been widely circulated as an officially endorsed pronouncement.45
Doctors went to prison.46 The hunt for addicts was pressed relentlessly.47
Prices rose, prisons filled, "dope rings" throve. The United States acquired
the renown of being the world's best market for illicit narcotics-a reputation
which stands unchallenged to this day.
When the Supreme Court was jolted into further action, it was too late
for the justices to alter the situation. They spoke firmly, but to no avail.
Dr. Linder's Case: A Theoretical Reversal
The jolt took the form of the next Behrman indictment case to reach the
Supreme Court.45 The facts in this case were fully as outrageous as in Dr.
Behrman's case, but invoked the opposite alignment of sympathy. Dr. Charles
0. Linder was a long-established practitioner in Spokane, Washington. with
a large practice. At four o'clock one Saturday, while he was examining a
female patient, with other patients waiting for him, four Narcotics Division
agents burst in upon him, and "boisterously and in an ungentlemanly and
forcible manner, took charge" of his office. When he protested, the agents
showed their Treasury Department badges and told him, "This is sufficient."
After a rowdy search they took him off to jail.-"
Dr. Linder was indicted in a word-for-word repetition of the Behrman in-
dictment, only this time the amount was three small tablets of cocaine and
narcotics authorities year after year in thdr annual reports. Sue, e.*t. U.S. TrJ- .
DEP'T, Ti~tmc IN OPIUM AND OTHER DANGERous DRUGS. 3 (192bj); id. at 3 (1271;
id. at 4 (1928).
43. See, New York Times, June 23, 1920, p. 8; Stevens, supra note 7, at 43.
44. REP. REF. Comm. o.- LEGis. & Pun. Rirxioxs (1924), reprinted in 82 A.M.A.J.
1967 (1924).
45. Stevens, supra note 7, at 43.
46. See Simmons v. United States, 300 Fed. 321 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Hobart v. United
States, 299 Fed. 784 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Manning v. United States, 287 Fed. S00 (8th Cir.
1923).
47. For many years the Division reported its "score" (in a column with other sta-
tistics) by the number of years in sentences imposed: e.g., (1926) 10,342 violations, 5,120
convictions, 6,797 years, 11 months, 10 days; (1928) 8,653 violations, 4,739 convictions,
8,786 years, 4 months, 28 days; (1933) 3,468 violations, 1,694 convictions, 3,24, years,
10 months, 18 days. See U.S. TnR.As. DEPT, THE Tnr.Fzri xz Oriv.i %.-D uVIniE1
DANGERous DRUGS (1926) and subsequent yearly reports.
48. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1924).
49. 'Motion to Quash Search W'Varrant, Transcript of Record, Linder v. Uriktd States,
268 U.S. 5 (1924).
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one of morphine. These had been given to an "addict-stool pigeon," who was
working for the agents. She claimed she had told him she was an addict; in
his version she had represented that she had a painful stomach ailment and
that the doctor who regularly treated her was out of the city.50
Linder was convicted,rl the Ninth Circuit affirmed,r and he petitioned for
certiorari, arguing:
"The [Harrison] act.., was not intended to trench on the police power
of the states, and ought not to be given an interpretation which would
bring within its purview an act the cognizance of which properly be-
longs to the states. . . . [T]he lower courts almost uniformly try
these narcotic cases on the theory that the purpose of the statute was
to punish physicians and others dispensing morphine or other nar-
cotics to satisfy the cravings of drug addicts, even where all the
revenue features of the act have been complied with, as registration,
payment of the tax, and the making and keeping of the records re-
quired by the act. We submit that the United States has nothing to
do with such acts. Whether the health and morals of their people
require that such practices be repressed by penal sanction is for the
states alone to determine."
"Now what is the nature of the act charged in the indictment, giving
the indictment the widest scope claimed for it? Simply that the de-
fendant, being a registered physician, dispensed a small quantity of
narcotic drugs to gratify the appetite of an addict."' 3
When the petition was granted, Solicitor General Beck disposed of the merits,
in the Government's brief, in a pithy five-page statement that attempted mere-
ly to pin the Court to its earlier declared position:
"Petitioner contends in substance that if the indictment and the
statute upon which it is founded, be construed as charging the ad-
ministration of drugs merely to gratify the appetite of an addict, such
an offense is beyond the power of Congress to create ...
"This is precisely what the indictment and the statute cover, and
what the court intended to uphold in U.S. v. Behrman, 258 U.S.
280, 287, 288....
"The indictment in the case at bar is framed in the same language
as the indictment in the above-mentioned Behrman case, except for
the amount of the drug alleged to have been sold or distributed other-
wise than in the course of professional practice. No distinction, how-
ever, can be made between the two cases on the ground merely of
the difference between the amounts of drugs which are charged in
the two indictments. In the Behrvnan case, supra, this court had
before it only the strict allegations of the indictment, and for that
50. Transcript of Trial, Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1924).
51. His sentence: $1000 and two months in jail. Transcript of Record, pp, 25-6,
Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1924).
52. Linder v. United States, 290 Fed. 173 (9th Cir. 1923).
53. Brief in Aid of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 9-11, Linder v. United State ,
268 U.S. 5 (1924).
[Vol. 62: 736
1953] THE NARCOTICS BUREAU 747
purpose the amount of the drug becomes immaterial in determining
whether the indictment actually and sufficiently charges it to have
been unlawfully sold or distributed.
"Petitioner also contends that the indictment is capable of the con-
struction, in substance, of charging that the drug was given in the
professional treatment of the addict. The Behrman case, supra, must
be held to dispose adversely of such claim, for if the indictment
there, of which the indictment at bar is a duplicate in allegation, had
been capable of such construction, this court would have said so." 74
The Court's opinion, handed down in 1925, was written by Justice McRey-
nolds, and was unanimous. Dr. Linder's conviction was reversed, and the
opinion is as emphatic in tone as circumstances could permit:
"The enactment under consideration levies a tax, upheld by this
court, upon every person who imports, manufactures, produces, com-
pounds, sells, deals in. dispenses or gives away opium or coca leaves
or derivatives therefrom, and may regulate medical practice in the
States only so far as reasonably appropriate for or merely incidental
to its enforcement. It says nothing of 'addicts' and does not under-
take to prescribe nethods for their medical treatment. They are dis-
eased and proper subjects for such treatment, and we cannot possibly
conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other
than medical purpose solely because he has dispensed to one of them,
in the ordinary course and in good faith, four small tablets of mor-
phine or cocaine for rclief of conditions incident to addiction."
Of the Webb case,50 the Court said:
"The answers thus given must not be construed as forbidding every
prescription for drugs, irrespective of quantity, when designed tem-
porarily to alleviate an addict's pains, although it may have been
issued in good faith and without design to defeat the revenues."5 7
Of the Jin Fuey Moy case:53
"The quoted language must be confined to circumstances like those
presented by the cause." 9
And of the Behrman case 'o itself:
"This opinion related to definitely alleged facts and must be so under-
stood.... The opinion cannot be accepted as authority for holding
that a physician who acts bona fide and according to fair medical
standards, may never give an addict moderate amounts of drugs for
self-administration in order to relieve conditions incident to addiction.
54. Brief of United States, pp. 3-5, Linder . United States, 263 U.S. 5 (1924).
55. Linder v. United States, 26S U.S. 5, IS (1925) (emphasis addcd).
56. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
57. Linder v. United States, 26S U.S. 5, 20 (1925).
58. jin Fuey Mfoy v. United States, 254 U.S. 1S9 (1920).
59. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 20 (1925).
60. United States v. Belrman, 25S U.S. 280 (1921).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Enforcement of the tax demands no such drastic rule, and if the Act
had such scope it would certainly encounter grave constitutional diffi-
culties."61
The lower federal courts have since been fairly true to this corrected in-
terpretation of the Harrison Act, when they have had opportunities to ex-
press themselves.0 2 But there have been few significant cases. The doctors
are still in retreat. And the Federal Narcotics Bureau has been undeterred
in its own lusty applications of the Act. Its regulations under Section 2 03
still provide (paraphrasing the loaded question in the discredited Webb
case 64) :
"An order purporting to be a prescription issued to an addict or
habitual user of narcotics, not in the course of professional treatment
but for the purpose of providing the user with narcotics sufficient to
keep him comfortable by maintaining his customary use, is not a pre-
scription within the meaning or intent of the Act; and the person
filling such an order, as -well as the person issuing it, may be charged
with violation of the law."'65
CONCLUSION
It wasn't many decades ago that sufferers from tuberculosis, sub nomine
"consumption," were regarded as unclean, and shunned by society. We have
stopped treating our insane population as felons, raised the ancient stigma
fiom leprosy and epilepsy, and transformed our penal philosophy from one of
vengeance to one of rehabilitation. We have shown growing interest in large-
scale attempts to salvage the victims of alcoholism; we caught up with most
of our error vis-a-vis the liquor drinker fifteen years ago.00 And we have
made venereal afflictions the subject of wholesome programs and campaigns.
But we have not shown comparable understanding of the addict's problems.
The true addict, by universally accepted definitions, is totally enslaved to
his habit. He will do anything to fend off the illness, marked by physical and
emotional agony, that results from abstinence. So long as society will not
traffic with him on any terms, he must remain the abject servitor of his vicious
nemesis, the peddler. The addict wuill commit crimes-mostly petty offenses
like shoplifting 07 and prostitution-to get the price the peddler asks. He will
61. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22 (1925) (emphasis added).
62. See United States v. Brandenberg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946).
63. See note 8 sup ra.
64. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
65. U.S. Treas. Dep't, Narcotics Bureau Reg. No. 5, art. 167 (1949), 26 CoDE Firt.
Rnms. § 151.167 (1949).
66. This analogy goes further. It was in the heyday of the bootlegger that organized
crime, as we know it today, got its start. Revenues from the illicit narcotic traffic are,
next to gambling, the largest current source of underworld wealth. Quite apart from
humanitarian considerations, we should end this billion-dollar-a-year subsidy to the
nation's real criminals.
67. See Comment, Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest: the Merchant's Dilemina,
62 YAI L.J. 788, 791 n.36 (1953).
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peddle dope and make new addicts if those are his master's terms. Drugs are
a commodity of trifling intrinsic value. All the billions our society has spent
enforcing criminal measures against the addict have had the sole practical
result of protecting the peddler's market, artificially inflating his prices, and
keeping his profits fantastically high.Gs No other nation hounds its addicts
as we do, and no other nation faces anything remotely resembling our problem.
Where does the solution lie? Out of reach, for the moment, because we
shall not undo forty years of carefully wrought error overnight. Out of sight,
also, at least in precise detail, because we have little reliable data to guide us.
But-at least until they are fully explored-the road would seem to lead
towards the following areas: (1) relief from persecution for the addict; (2)
therapy programs through institutions,09 clinics, r ° and after-cure follow-
ups ;l1 (3) provisions for incurables, through clinics or the individual prac-
titioner or both; 72 (4) a forthright out-of-the-dark educational program on
narcotics; and (5) a vigorous assault, with all the enforcement resources we
can muster, on whatever is left of the peddlers' empire after we have freed the
addict from his present bondage to it.
Sooner or later some responsible appraiser, probably Congress, will have
to take a clear look at our narcotics problem and the plight of the addict. It
is to be hoped that re-telling this tale, of Dr. Behrman, who was rightly
punished for the wrong reasons, and Dr. Linder, who was vindicated in vain,
may hasten the advent of that happy day.
68. At frequent intervals the federal narcotics authorities publish tables of the going
rates for illicit drugs. See, e.g., U.S. Tms. DEP'v, Tm -r-c m: Opt':iv , OTIuq
DANo anous DRUGs 26 (1930). In this issue the Narcotics Division ntes a "marked
general increase in the prices of narcotic drugs. . . . This is a fair indication of the
relative scarcity of narcotic drugs in the illicit market, due to increased cf-ciency 4,f
narcotic-law enforcement."
69. Such as the federal hospitals administered by the U.S. Public Health Servic,',
58 STAT. 698 (1944), 42 U.S.C. §257 (1946), the North Brother Island Hospital exp-ri-
ment in New York, and the proposed Seabrook Farm Unit in New Jersey.
70. A bill to create a Federal Bureau of Clinics. to develop this approach to the
problem, is now pending in Congress: H.R. 2449, 83d Cong., 1st Sees. (1953). The Lill
also includes alcoholics, as beneficiaries of the Fame program. For discussion of clinic
system merits, see Comment, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L.J. 751, 7047 (1953).
71. This would perhaps be another function of narcotic clinics; it is contemplated, in
connection with H.R. 2449, supra note 70, that other federal agi.ncies, such as the
U. S. Employment Service, would be called upon to cooperate in placing and renhabilitat-
ing addicts.
72. See Stevens, Make Dope Legal, Harpers Magazine, November, 1952, p. 40.
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